Quem fiscaliza o fiscal? O julgamento das contas dos tribunais de contas pelo poder legislativo

Abstract

This work analyzes the duty-power of the Legislative Branch to exercise external control over the Audit Courts. Initially, the separation of powers stands out from Greece to the ideologues of the Constitution of the United States of America, passing through the philosophers Montesquieu and Locke, with an emphasis on the role of the legislature. It emphasizes that the Constitution of the Republic of 1988 enshrined the system of internal and external control over the organs and powers of the republic (art. 70, caput, of CR/88). In effect, external control is exercised by the Legislative Branch, with the assistance of the Court of Auditors. It considers the lack of external supervision over the TCU, given the scenario in which the Federal Court of Auditors exercises accounting, financial, budgetary, operational and patrimonial supervision in light of the tripod of legality, legitimacy and economy over other bodies and powers (control external), but recognizes itself as constitutionally responsible for self-inspection (absence of external control), in clear conflict with the republican principle, the separation of powers, checks and balances and the oversight function of the Legislative Power. within the scope of the Union, the Federal Audit Court assesses the accounts of its presidents, limiting itself to sending a mere report to the National Congress, while in the State of Amazonas, although the State Audit Court reports to the Legislative Assembly, these are devoid of essential documents for a sound analysis, such as copies of bidding procedures, administrative and settlement contracts, commitments and payments made. Finally, it verifies that the deliberations of these accounts by the Legislative Assembly of the State of Amazonas require a more in-depth analysis and a broad debate in plenary.